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Comments
Private Citizen Enforcement of The Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law
INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law' is a regulatory statute
designed to prevent further pollution of the waters of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and to restore presently polluted wa-
ters within the state to clean, unpolluted conditions.2 Primary au-
thority to enforce the statute and the regulations promulgated
thereunder is given to the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources ("DER").3 However, the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture amended the Clean Streams Law in 1980 to include a citizen
suit provision by adding section 601(c).' This comment will analyze
1. Act of June 22, 1937, 1937 Pa Laws 1987, as amended 35 Pa Stat § 691.1 et seq
(Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
2. 35 Pa Stat § 691.4 (Purdon 1977).
3. Section 691.5 provides:
[t]he department shall have the power and its duty shall be to ... [flormulate,
adopt, promulgate and repeal such rules and regulations and issue such orders as are
necessary to implement the provisions of this act... [and to] [i]ssue such orders as
may be necessary to implement the provisions of this act or the rules and regulations
of the department.
35 Pa Stat § 691.5 (Purdon Supp 1992).
4. Act of October 10, 1980, 1980 Pa Laws 157, as amended 35 Pa Stat § 691.601
(Purdon Supp 1992). It should be noted at the outset that prior to the addition of section
601(c) private parties were able to sue an alleged polluter under the common law of public
nuisance. As will be discussed in this comment, the Clean Streams Law, as originally en-
acted, Act of June 22, 1937, 1937 Pa Laws 1987, declared that violations of the Act are
nuisances, and furthermore, in section 601(a) declared that these "nuisances per se" are
abatable in accordance with the common law of public nuisance. The interplay of section
601(a) and section 601(c) will be discussed throughout this comment. Notably, this com-
ment will refer to both section 601(a) and section 601(c) as citizen suit provisions because
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the citizen suit provision of section 601(c) of the Clean Streams
Law as well as section 601(a),' which also provides for citizen en-
forcement of the Clean Streams Law. The focus will be placed on
the maintenance of a citizen suit by a private citizen against an
alleged polluter.' Specifically, this comment will focus on the ques-
tion of who can maintain a citizen suit under the Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law and the potential bars to the maintenance of
such a suit. The issue of standing to bring suit under both section
601(a) and section 601(c) will be analyzed and the differences be-
tween those two sections discussed. Additionally, the issues of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the sixty-day notification requirement, the
''ongoing violation" requirement and the bar resulting from the
government's diligent prosecution of the violation in a court, all
part of the Act, will be discussed. Due to the limited amount of
existing case law interpretation of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams
Law, analogies to federal case law interpretation of similar lan-
guage in the federal environmental statutes will be made through-
out this comment.
At its simplest level, the Clean Streams Law prohibits the dis-
charge of industrial waste7 into the waters of the Commonwealth
without a permit." Likewise, the discharge of sewage is prohibited9
both statutory provisions allow private citizens to enforce the Clean Streams Law.
5. Section 601(a) reads in part:
Any activity or condition declared by this act to be a nuisance or which is otherwise
in violation of this act, shall be abatable in the manner provided by law or equity for
the abatement of public nuisances. In addition, suits to abate such nuisances or suits
to restrain or prevent any violation of this act may be instituted in equity or at law in
the name of the Commonwealth upon relation of the Attorney General .
35 Pa Stat § 691.601(a) (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
6. Section 601(c) of the Clean Streams Law, 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c)(Purdon Supp
1992) also allows citizen suits to be filed against the DER where the DER allegedly fails to
perform a nondiscretionary act. This comment will not address those situations where suit is
filed against the DER for failure to act.
7. Industrial Waste is defined as:
any liquid, gaseous, radioactive, solid or other substance, not sewage, resulting from
any manufacturing or industry, or from any [industrial] establishment .. , and mine
drainage, refuse, silt, coal mine solids, rock, debris, dirt and clay from coal mines, coal
collieries, breakers or other coal processing operations. "Industrial waste" shall in-
clude all such substances whether or not generally characterized as waste.
35 Pa Stat § 691.1 (Purdon Supp 1992).
8. "No person . . . shall discharge or permit the discharge of industrial wastes in
any manner, directly or indirectly, into any of the waters of the Commonwealth unless such
discharge is authorized by the rules and regulations of the department or such person . ..
has first obtained a permit from the department." 35 Pa Stat § 691.307(a) (Purdon 1977 &
Supp 1992).
9. See 35 Pa Stat § 691.202 (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
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as is the discharge of any other substance which results in pollu-
tion."0 Permits authorizing discharges can be obtained from the
DER." As stated, the primary enforcement authority is given to
the DER, who is empowered to issue enforcement orders, 2 assess
civil penalties' s or institute actions to abate any violation of the
Clean Streams Law.1
4
STANDING TO BRING SUIT
In addition to authorizing the Commonwealth, through the
DER, to enforce the Clean Streams Law, the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture provided for citizens to enforce the statute."5 The provision
found in section 601(c) states that "any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action
on his own behalf to compel compliance with this act . . . against
any other person alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
act. .. ."I' However, not everyone is entitled to bring such a citi-
zen suit. Consequently, exactly who can bring a suit to enforce the
statute is the threshold issue in determining whether a citizen suit
can be maintained.
A great number of citizen suits filed under the numerous regula-
tory statutes' are commenced by environmental organizations
such as the Sierra Club or a Public Interest Research Group
("PIRG"). The defendants in these citizen suits often raise the de-
fense that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the Sierra Club had standing to bring a suit seeking to
10. Specifically, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to put or place into any of
the waters of the Commonwealth, or allow or permit to be discharged from property owned
or occupied by such person or municipality into any of the waters of the Commonwealth,
any substance of any kind or character resulting in pollution as herein defined." 35 Pa Stat
§ 691.401 (Purdon 1977).
11. 35 Pa Stat § 691.5(b)(5) (Purdon Supp 1992).
12. 35 Pa Stat § 691.610 (Purdon Supp 1992).
13. 35 Pa Stat § 691.605 (Purdon Supp 1992).
14. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(a) (Purdon Supp 1992).
15. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c) (Purdon Supp 1992).
16. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c).
17. Citizen suits can be filed under several environmental regulatory statutes, both
state and federal, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (also known as the
Clean Water Act), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 USC § 6901 et
seq (1988), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1988), the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, and the




enjoin federal officials from approving the construction of an ex-
tensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the Se-
quoia National Forest.18 The Sierra Club relied upon section 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 19 which provides: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rel-
evant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."20 The Court,
in holding that the Sierra Club lacked standing, followed its prece-
dent of Data Processing Service v Camp,2 1 which established that
a person has standing under section 10 of the APA if the federal
agency action caused them "injury in fact," and if the alleged in-
jury was to an interest which was "arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated" by the statute allegedly vio-
lated by the agency.2 2 The Court recognized that the Sierra Club
had alleged an injury to a cognizable interest, that being injury to
mental and aesthetic interests, but the Court determined that the
Sierra Club failed to allege that any of its members actually used
the Mineral King Valley area.23 Therefore, the Court determined
that the Sierra Club had not alleged an "injury in fact" and thus
lacked standing.
While the Sierra Club was found to lack standing, the founda-
tion which Sierra Club v Morton laid to determine standing did
not set forth an onerous standard. 4 So long as it is alleged that the
affected area is used by the plaintiff, the requirement of Sierra
Club v Morton is met. "The major principle established by Sierra
Club v Morton was that standing may be based on an injury to
non-economic interests, such as aesthetic, conservational, or recre-
ational values. '25 Thus, citizen suits brought by environmental
groups can usually withstand a challenge based on lack of standing
18. Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 92 S Ct 1361 (1972).
19. 5 USC § 702 (1988).
20. Morton, 405 US at 732.
21. 397 US 150, 90 S Ct 827 (1970).
22. Morton, 405 US at 733.
23. Id at 734-35. "The alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use Min-
eral King and Sequoia National Park. . . . The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its
members would be affected.. . . Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state
that its members use Mineral King for any purpose. ... Id at 735.
24. See Frank P. Grad, 1 Treatise on Environmental Law § 3.03 at 3-340 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc.. 1992).
25. Proffitt v Municipal Authority of the Borough of Morrisville, 716 F Supp 837
(ED Pa 1989), aff'd 897 F2d 523 (3d Cir 1990). In this case, the plaintiff alleged violations of
the Federal Clean Water Act and the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law. The court deter-
mined that the plaintiff did have standing. Borough of Morrisville, 716 F Supp at 841-42.
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by merely alleging injury to "aesthetic conservational and recrea-
tional values" and that members of the group use the affected
area.
20
The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law contains a provision that
gives standing to bring a citizen suit to "any person having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected. 2 7 Interpretation of
the foregoing clause seems to equate with the "injury in fact" anal-
ysis of Sierra Club v Morton which interpreted the federal APA.
Therefore, one can speculate that this federal decision would be
given some weight in interpreting the Pennsylvania Clean Streams
Law's similar standing provision. However, few cases have inter-
preted this language as it appears in the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law.
In one recent case in which a citizen suit was filed under the
Clean Streams Law, the defendant made the argument that the
plaintiff lacked standing.28 The interesting aspect of that case was
the status of the plaintiff. While most citizen suit plaintiffs are en-
vironmental groups or neighboring landowners, the plaintiff in
Dresser Industries was the person who arguably caused the
pollution.
From 1954 to 1972 a division of Dresser Industries conducted
mining operations on land which it leased. 9 Since 1963, acid mine
drainage seeped into the waters of the Commonwealth."0 In 1991,
the DER ordered Dresser Industries to abate the drainage."1
Dresser Industries appealed the order to the Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Hearing Board and while the appeal was pending,
Dresser Industries filed a citizen suit under the Clean Streams Law
against the current owner of the land seeking to have the land-
owner compelled to abate the drainage.32 The current landowner
26. It should be noted that most of the case law determining whether a citizen suit
plaintiff has standing has been decided under federal statutes and not the Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law. The language of section 505(g) of the Clean Water Act, 33 USC §
1365(g) (1988), however, is nearly identical to that of the Clean Streams Law. Section 505(g)
defines citizen as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." 33 USC § 1365(g). Compared to section 601(c) of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams
Law which provides that "any person having an interest which is or may be adversely af-
fected may commence a civil action . 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c) (Purdon Supp 1992).
27. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c).
28. Dresser Industries, Inc. v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources, Pa Commw , 604 A2d 1177 (1992).
29. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1179.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law provides: "Whenever the department
Comments1993 509
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happened to be the Commonwealth who had committed the care of
the site to the DER's Bureau of State Parks."
One of the several defenses raised by the DER was that Dresser
Industries lacked standing because it did not have an interest
which was adversely affected.3 4 In determining whether the plain-
tiff had standing, the court looked to the language of the statute
and determined that "[w]hile a plausible argument can be made
that Dresser is not yet adversely affected, there is no doubt that
Dresser 'may be adversely affected' if it is finally ordered to rem-
edy the entire seepage problem without any recourse against DER,
the landowner."35 Thus, the court determined that Dresser did
have standing.
The DER also argued that Dresser Industries did not have
standing to abate a public nuisance because it did not have an in-
terest distinguishing it from the general public.3 6 This argument
stems from the fact that throughout the Clean Streams Law, viola-
tions of particular sections are declared to be nuisances.3 7 Further-
more, section 601(a) of the statute states that "[a]ny activity or
condition declared by this act to be a nuisance or which is other-
wise in violation of this act, shall be abatable in the manner pro-
vided by law or equity for the abatement of public nuisances."38
Thus, the DER focused on the language of section 601(a) and
claimed that Dresser did not have standing to bring a suit for
abatement of a public nuisance.39 The court nevertheless deter-
mined that Dresser Industries' connection with the land was suffi-
ciently different in kind from that of the general public to give
finds that pollution or a danger of pollution is resulting from a condition which exists on
land in the Commonwealth the department may order the landowner or occupier to correct
the condition in a manner satisfactory to the department . 35 Pa Stat § 691.316 (Pur-
don 1977 & Supp 1992).
33. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1179.
34. Id at 1184.
35. Id (emphasis in original).
36. Id.
37. For example, the following sections provide: "[a] discharge of industrial wastes
without a permit ... is hereby declared to be a nuisance." 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c) (Purdon
1977 & Supp 1992); "[a] discharge of sewage without a permit ... is hereby declared to be
a nuisance." 35 Pa Stat § 691.202 (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992); "[a]ny such discharge is
hereby declared to be a nuisance." 35 Pa Stat § 691.401 (Purdon 1977).
38. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(a) (Purdon Supp 1992).
39. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1184. In order to maintain an action seeking to
abate a public nuisance, the plaintiff "must have suffered harm of a kind different from that
suffered by other members of the public . Philadelphia Electric Co. v Hercules, Inc.,
762 F2d 303, 315 (3d Cir 1985)(quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821(c)(1)).
Vol. 31:505
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Dresser standing to abate a public nuisance.' 0
The analysis in Dresser Industries distinguishes between the
standing requirement set forth in section 601(c)"1 and the standing
requirement of a public nuisance plaintiff pursuant to section
601(a)."' Which standing requirement is applicable depends upon
whether the suit is brought under section 601(a) or section 601(c).
In order to bring suit under section 601(c), the citizen suit plaintiff
must meet the statutory requirement of "having an interest which
is or may be adversely affected." On the other hand, the standing
requirement that a plaintiff under section 601(a) must meet is gov-
erned by the common law of nuisance: the plaintiff must have suf-
fered an injury different in kind from that of the general public. A
comparison of these two standing requirements follows.
In Dresser Industries, the court determined that the citizen suit
plaintiff not only had an interest which might have been adversely
affected but also had an interest which distinguished it from the
general public. Therefore, it appeared that the requirement for
both tests of standing might be the same.43 However, in O'Leary v
Moyer's Landfill, Inc.," the court distinguished the two standing
requirements.
In O'Leary, the plaintiffs brought citizen suits under the Federal
Clean Water Act and under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law
alleging that leachate from the defendant's landfill was being dis-
charged into waters of the Commonwealth.' 5 The court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing under the
Federal Clean Water Act but concluded that the defendant had
violated the Federal Clean Water Act.46 The court did, however,
address the issue of standing under the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law.'7 The court reasoned that because the defendant
40. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1184. For a case holding that the plaintiff did not
have the requisite type of injury to distinguish himself from the general public, See O'Leary
v Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F Supp 642 (ED Pa 1981).
41. Section 601(c), 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c) allows "any person
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected. to compel compliance with this
act .. " Id.
42. See note 39.
43. That is to say that if a person has an interest which is or may be adversely af-
fected, then that person also has an interest different in kind than the general public.
44. 523 F Supp 642 (ED Pa 1981).
45. O'Leary, 523 F Supp at 646. The plaintiffs also brought counts under RCRA, the
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), 35 Pa Stat § 6018.101 et seq (Purdon
Supp 1992), and Pennsylvania common law of negligence and nuisance. O'Leary at 646.
46. Id at 655.
47. Id at 657.
1993
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had violated the Federal Clean Water Act, the defendant had also
violated the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law. 8 In a footnote, the
court stated, without explanation or discussion, that the plaintiffs
had standing under section 601(c) of the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law."9 However, upon addressing the plaintiffs' standing
under section 601(a) of the Clean Streams Law, the court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing.50 Looking to the standing required
to abate a public nuisance, the court determined that the plaintiffs
did not "allege and prove specific injury 'over and above the injury
suffered by the public.' ' 5' Although not specifically stated,
O'Leary impliedly distinguished the standing required under sec-
tion 601(a) from the standing required under section 601(c). Ap-
parently, section 601(c)'s standard of "having an interest which is
or may be adversely affected '5 2 is an easier standard to satisfy
than "suffer[ing] harm of a kind different from that suffered by
other members of the public""3 or incurring "injury above the in-
jury suffered by the public generally, '54 as required by section
601(a).
As a consequence of the different standing requirements of sec-
tion 601(a) and section 601(c), a potential citizen suit plaintiff has
a choice as to the section of the Clean Streams Law under which
he wishes to proceed. The decision of which section to bring the
citizen suit under may be influenced by the remedy sought by the
citizen suit plaintiff.
REMEDIES
While the DER is authorized to not only compel compliance
with the statute but also to assess civil penalties, 5 the decision
rendered in City of Philadelphia v Stepan Chemical Co.56 holds
48. Id.
49. Id. See footnote 34 of the O'Leary opinion.
50. Id.
51. Id citing Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Bravo
Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa 350, 237 A2d 342, 348 (1968). This standing requirement of a
public nuisance plaintiff should be compared to that cited in Dresser Industries. See note
39.
52. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c).
53. Philadelphia Electric Co., 762 F2d at 315. See note 39.
54. O'Leary, 523 F Supp at 657. See note 51 and accompanying text.
55. "In addition to proceeding under any other remedy available at law or in equity
for a violation of a provision of this act. . . the department, after hearing, may assess a civil
penalty upon a person or municipality for such violation." 35 Pa Stat § 691.605(a) (Purdon
Supp 1992).
56. 544 F Supp 1135 (ED Pa 1982).
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for the proposition that "private parties are not authorized by the
[Clean Streams Law] to maintain an action for civil penalties.
'57
Therefore, citizen suit. plaintiffs can only seek injunctive relief. The
Clean Streams Law, however, seems to differentiate between two
possible forms of injunctive relief available to a citizen suit plain-
tiff. Section 601(c) allows citizens to "compel compliance with this
act" while section 601(a) states that any violation of the act "shall
be abatable in the manner provided by law or equity for the abate-
ment of public nuisances." Thus, these two different remedies may
influence a citizen suit plaintiff in his decision as to which section
to base the suit upon.
In some situations, the same result can be achieved whether the
suit is brought under section 601(a) or under section 601(c). For
example, in the situation where the violation of the statute is the
unpermitted discharge of industrial waste from a landfill or an
abandoned hazardous waste dump, compelling compliance with the
Clean Streams Law would most likely mean ceasing the discharge.
This would in turn entail abating the nuisance. Thus, in this situa-
tion, compelling compliance with the Clean Streams Law would
achieve the same result as abating the nuisance. A plaintiff who is
concerned about whether or not he can meet the standing require-
ments of a public nuisance plaintiff can probably circumvent the
problem by bringing suit under section 601(c) asking the court to
order the defendant to comply with the Clean Streams Law. If the
citizen suit plaintiff prevails in a suit under section 601(c), the
remedy would be that the defendant would be required to comply
with the Clean Streams Law. This would most likely be accom-
plished by ordering the defendant to cease the unlawful discharges.
In order to cease the unpermitted discharges, the defendant would
need to abate the condition causing the discharges (i.e. abate the
nuisance) .58
However, this is not to say that all citizen suits should be
brought under section 601(c) as opposed to section 601(a). There
are other differences between these two sections which may be of
concern to a potential citizen suit plaintiff.59
57. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F Supp at 1151.
58. An alternative remedy is to require the defendant to obtain a permit from the
DER in order to continue discharging pollutants into the waters of the Commonwealth.
Additionally, there remains the issue of whether the defendant will be required to restore
the waters of the Commonwealth to the condition in which they existed prior to the defend-
ant's discharge of pollutants.




One such concern is whether the court has subject matter juris-
diction. In Dresser Industries, the DER made the argument that
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction.60 Citizen suits brought under section 601(c) must be
brought in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas as the statute
provides that "any other provision of the law to the contrary not-
withstanding, the courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction of
such actions .. "61 In Erie County League of Women Voters v
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources, 2 the commonwealth court determined that an action
brought under section 601(c) could not be maintained due to lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff had brought the citi-
zen suit in the commonwealth court in conjunction with an alleged
violation of the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act.6 ' The court
dismissed the counts brought under the Sewage Facilities Act for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.65 Having dismissed the
other counts, the court was obliged to dismiss the count alleging a
violation of the Clean Streams Law under the language of section
601(c) due to the lack of jurisdiction.6
The citizen suit plaintiff in Dresser Industries, however, was
able to circumvent the jurisdictional problem encountered by the
plaintiffs in Erie County League of Women Voters. By bringing an
additional count under section 601(a) to abate a public nuisance,
the plaintiff in Dresser Industries was able to withstand a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdictional
provision of section 601(a) reads "[s]uch proceedings, [to abate a
public nuisance], may be prosecuted in the Commonwealth court,
or in the court of common pleas of the county where the activity
affect the issues of standing and the available remedy as discussed, but will also affect the
issues of: (1) whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction; (2) which statute of limita-
tions applies; and (3) what notices are required to be sent.
60. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1179.
61. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c).
62. 106 Pa Commw 369, 525 A2d 1290 (1987).
63. Erie County League of Women Voters, 525 A2d at 1293.
64. 35 Pa Stat § 750.1 et seq (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
65. Erie County League of Women Voters, 525 A2d at 1292. The plaintiffs had the
opportunity to request a hearing before the local agency but failed to do so. The court de-
termined that "'tJheir failure to pursue this adequate administrative remedy precludes our
judicial review .. " Id.
66. Id at 1293.
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has taken place. . .. "67 The commonwealth court in Dresser In-
dustries, therefore, retained jurisdiction over the section 601(c) cit-
izen suit under ancillary jurisdiction and had original jurisdiction
over the section 601(a) count.69 Accordingly, the section of the
Clean Streams Law upon which the citizen suit plaintiff bases his
suit will dictate which court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case. Therefore, if for some reason the suit is brought in the
commonwealth court, the citizen suit plaintiff would need to plead
a count under section 601(a) in order for that court to have subject
matter jurisdiction over the case.70
SIXTY-DAY NOTIFICATION
if the citizen suit plaintiff has standing to bring the suit and has
chosen the proper court in which to bring it, there are still other
prerequisites which must be complied with in order for the suit to
be maintained. Section 601(e) of the Clean Streams Law requires
the plaintiff to give notice of the violation to both the DER and
the alleged violator.71 The Federal Clean Water Act contains a sim-
ilar notification requirement, 2 as does the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA")7 3 and the Federal Clean Air Act.
74
There exists a dearth of case law interpreting the provision in the
Clean Streams Law that requires citizen suit plaintiffs to give noti-
fication. Therefore, the federal law pertaining to this issue will be
67. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(a).
68. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 761(c) (Purdon 1981) provides in part: "the Common-
wealth Court shall have ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other matter which is related
to a claim or other matter otherwise within its exclusive original jurisdiction." 42 Pa Cons
Stat Ann §761(c).
69. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1183.
70. Recall the discussion of standing to bring suit as it pertained to standing under
section 601(a) found at notes 36-54 and accompanying text. The plaintiff would need to
possess the requisite standing, that of a public nuisance plaintiff, in order to maintain the
suit in the commonwealth court.
71. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(e) (Purdon Supp 1992) provides in part: "No action pursu-
ant to this section may be commenced prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
in writing of the violation to the department and to any alleged violator. 35 Pa Stat §
691.601(e).
72. Section 505(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act(Clean Water Act), 33
USC § 1365(b) (1988) provides: "No action may be commenced ... prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator [of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency], (ii) to the state in which the alleged violation occurs,
and (iii) to any alleged violator .. " 33 USC § 1365(b).
73. 42 USC § 6972(b) (1988). "No action may be commenced... prior to 60 days
after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation to (i) the Administrator; (ii) the State in
which the alleged violation occurs; and (iii) to any alleged violator. 42 USC § 6972(b).
74. 42 USC § 7604(b) (1988).
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analyzed as it might give some insight as to how the analogous pro-
vision of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law will be interpreted.
In Hallstrom v Tillamook County,76 the United States Supreme
Court determined that the giving of the sixty day notice to the
appropriate persons was a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintain-
ing a citizen suit under RCRA.76 The Court held "that the notice
and 60-day delay requirements are mandatory conditions prece-
dent to commencing suit under... [a] citizen suit provision....
The citizen suit was dismissed because the plaintiffs, although they
gave notice to the defendant, failed to give timely notice to the
state in which the alleged violations occurred.78 Halistrom thus
settled a split among the circuit courts as to whether notification
needed to be given. 9
An interesting post-Ha lstrom argument was made in Canada
Community Improvement Society v City of Michigan City.80 In
this case the citizen suit plaintiffs sent, via certified mail, notice of
their intention to bring a lawsuit.8 ' However, the notifications did
not satisfy the precise requirements of EPA's regulations82 in re-
gard to the content of the notifications. In opposition to the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff attempted to distinguish
Halistrom by arguing that "Hallstrom addressed only the requisite
timing of notice, rather than the requisite form or content of no-
tice." 83 The plaintiffs in effect argued that so long as notice is sent
sixty days prior to commencing an action, the contents of the no-
75. 493 US 20, 110 S Ct 304 (1989).
76. Although Halistrom dealt with a citizen suit under RCRA, the court acknowl-
edged that the notification provisions of the other federal regulatory statutes were nearly
identical. See Hallstrom, 110 S Ct at 307.
77. Id at 311.
78. Id at 312.
79. The First, Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals determined that the no-
tification requirement was a mandatory prerequisite. See Garcia v Cecos International, Inc.
761 F2d 76 (1st Cir 1985); City of Highland Park v Train, 519 F2d 681 (7th Cir 1975); and
Hallstrom v Tillamook County, 844 F2d 598 (9th Cir 1987). The Third Circuit determined
that if the proper persons had "notice in fact" of the alleged violations then the sixty-day
notification provision was satisfied. Proffitt v Commissioners, Township of Bristol, 754 F2d
504 (3d Cir 1985).
80. 742 F Supp 1025 (ND Ind 1990).
81. Canada Community Improvement Society, 742 F Supp at 1028.
82. Section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act provides: "Notice under this subsection
shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 33 USC §
1365(b). The regulations promulgated under this section appear at 40 CFR Part 135 (1992).
These regulations set forth requirements pertaining to the contents of the notice, the service
of the notice and the service of the complaint.
83. Canada Community Improvement Society, 742 F Supp at 1029.
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tice were sufficient if the person receiving it had "notice in fact" of
the violation. 4 The court did not decide this issue but instead
stated that the notice was not sufficient to constitute "notice in
fact."8 However, a strict interpretation of the statute, as was done
by Halistrom, requires notification to conform to EPA's regula-
tions.8 6 While the plaintiffs in Canada Community Improvement
Society presented an innovative argument that has yet to be ruled
on, it is likely that the content as well as timing of the notice must
conform to EPA's regulations. This result is probably required af-
ter the Supreme Court's decision in Hallstrom which strictly inter-
preted the literal language of the statute.
One difference between the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law
and the federal counterparts is that the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law does not mandate the DER to promulgate regula-
tions pertaining to the notification provision. 7 Therefore, the noti-
fication requirements that a Clean Streams Law citizen suit plain-
tiff would need to meet are contained only in the statute itself in
section 601(e). Unfortunately, there is little case law interpreting
section 601(e) of the Clean Streams Law. The one case that did
address the sufficiency of the notifications was Dresser Indus-
tries.88 In Dresser Industries, the defendant argued that the requi-
site notices were not sent.89 The court simply rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the complaint contained ample allegations that
the appropriate notifications were given."0 The court also rejected
the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was required to give
notice to the Attorney General of intent to bring suit under section
601(a).9 1 The court recognized that the notice that is to be given to
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See note 82. The use of the mandatory "shall" implies that notification must con-
form to the EPA's regulations.
87. See 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(e). Although the DER is not mandated to promulgate
regulations pertaining to the notification provision as the EPA is required to do, an analogy
to the federal law can still be fairly drawn. As previously set forth in this comment, the
language of the federal notification provision and the Pennsylvania counterpart are quite
similar except for the administrative regulations that the federal statute requires. Thus,
under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, a citizen suit plaintiff would still be required to
give sixty days notice just as would a Federal Clean Water Act citizen suit plaintiff. The
only difference is that a Clean Streams Law citizen suit plaintiff need not comply with any
administrative regulations regarding the sending of the notifications.
88. See note 28 and accompanying text.
89. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1183.
90. Id at 1184. The court did construe section 601(e) as only requiring "notice of the
violation" and not requiring notice of intent to sue. Id.
91. Id. Section 601(a) provides in pertinent part: "suits to abate such nuisances or
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the Attorney General is required only if the suit is brought in his
name."2 In this case, the plaintiffs had brought suit in their own
right."3 It would thus appear that the notification provision of sec-
tion 601(a) would not be required of citizen suit plaintiffs so long
as they bring suit in their own right.9 ' The notification provision of
section 601(e) must, however, be complied with in order to main-
tain a citizen suit under either section 601(a) or section 601(c).
9 5
ONGOING VIOLATION
Another potential bar to the maintenance of a citizen suit
brought under section 601(c) of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams
Law is the requirement that the plaintiff allege an "ongoing viola-
tion." Section 601(c) allows citizen suits to be filed against "any
other person alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
act."9" Nearly identical language appearing in the Federal Clean
Water Act" was construed by the United States Supreme Court in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v Chesapeake Bay Foundation.s
The Supreme Court interpreted the language of the statute liter-
ally and determined that the citizen plaintiffs must "allege a state
of either continuous or intermittent violation."9 9 Thus, if the al-
leged violations are "wholly past," then the court lacks jurisdiction
and the suit will be dismissed.100 But, as long as the citizen plain-
tiff makes a "good-faith allegation" that the violations are either
suits to restrain or prevent any violation of this act may be instituted in equity or at law in
the name of the Commonwealth upon relation of the Attorney General . . .after notice has
first been served upon the Attorney General of the intention. . . to so proceed." 35 Pa Stat
§ 691.601(a).
92. Dresser Industries, 604 A2d at 1184.
93. Id.
94. Whether a person can bring a suit in his or*her own right would be governed by
the issue of standing which was previously discussed in this comment at notes 15-54 and
accompanying text.
95. Although not yet specifically addressed by a court, it is likely that the holding of
Halistrom, requiring notice to be given as a jurisdictional prerequisite, would pertain to the
Clean Streams Law's sixty day notification provision. It should also be noted that section
601(f) excuses the sixty-day waiting period "in the case where the violation or order com-
plained of constitutes an imminent threat to the health or safety or [sic] the plaintiff or
would immediately affect a legal interest of the plaintiff." 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(f) (Purdon
Supp 1992).
96. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(c).
97. 33 USC § 1365(a) (1988) allows citizen suits to be filed against "any person ...
who is alleged to be in violation [of the Clean Water Act]." 33 USC § 1365(a).
98. 484 US 49, 108 S Ct 376 (1987).
99. Gwaltney, 108 S Ct at 381.
100. Id at 385.
continuous or intermittent, 1 ' the' court will have jurisdiction.10s As
the language of section 601(c) of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams
Law closely parallels that of the Clean Water Act, it is likely that a
court would apply the Gwaltney holding to citizen suits brought
under section 601(c) of the Clean Streams Law. 03 It should be
noted, however, that the Gwaltney holding would probably not be
applied to suits brought under section 601(a) of the Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law. Section 601(a) does not contain the "alleged
to be in violation" language that was construed in Gwaltney and
appears in section 601(c).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although not yet addressed by a court contemplating a citizen
suit filed under the Clean 'Streams Law, another potential bar to
the maintenance of such a citizen suit is the running of a statute of
limitations. The Clean Streams Law does not set forth a statute of
limitations for citizen suits. 04 Depending upon which subsection of
section 601 the suit is brought, a statute of limitations may or may
not be applicable.
If a citizen plaintiff files suit under section 601(c) seeking to
compel compliance with the Clean Streams Law, then the plaintiff
must allege an ongoing violation of the statute. s05 It is oxymoronic
to apply a statute of limitations to a violation which is ongoing.
Thus, it would appear that no statute of limitations would apply to
suits brought under section 601(c). If, however, the citizen plaintiff
files suit under section 601(a) seeking to abate a public nuisance, it
would appear that the common law of nuisance and its correspond-
101. The Court defined intermittent violation as a "reasonable likelihood that a past
polluter will continue to pollute in the future." Id at 381.
102. Id at 385. The court acknowledged the defendant's concern over frivolous allega-
tions but determined that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
pleadings to be based on good faith beliefs, well grounded in fact, provides adequate protec-
tion against baseless allegations. Id.
103. One potential limitation to the Gwaltney holding is that the case was decided in
regard to a violation of a NPDES permit limitation. It can be argued that the holding in
Gwaltney does not apply to a situation where an alleged polluter has discharged into waters
of the United States or of the Commonwealth without a permit.
104. The Clean Streams Law does, however, specify a statute of limitations of five
years upon actions brought by DER seeking civil penalties under section 605. 35 Pa Stat §
691.605(c)(Purdon Supp 1992). Recall that citizen suit plaintiffs are precluded from seeking
civil penalties. City of Philadelphia v Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F Supp 1135 (ED Pa 1982).
See also note 56 and accompanying text.
105. See notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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ing statute of limitations would apply.106 Thus, depending upon
whether the citizen plaintiff proceeds under section 601(a) or sec-
tion 601(c), there may be a statute of limitations applicable to the
action.
10 7
THE DER's DILIGENT PROSECUTION IN A COURT
Another potential bar to citizen suits which has been litigated as
it pertains to the federal regulatory statutes, but not yet in the
context of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, is the situation in
which the state or federal government is already prosecuting the
violation(s). °10 Sedtion 601(e) of the Clean Streams Law provides
in part: "No action pursuant to this section may be commenced
. ..if the department has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States or a state to re-
quire compliance with this act. .. ."o09 Similar language in the
Federal Clean Water Act'10 has been literally construed by several
courts to bar a citizen suit only if the EPA or State counterpart
106. The statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action for nuisance is probably
two years. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5524(7)(Purdon 1981 & Supp 1992). See also Sustrik v
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 413 Pa 324, 197 A2d 44 (1964). There still remains, however,
the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run. One court determined that the
statute begins to run from the time the nuisance is discovered or should have been discov-
ered. Nene v Butler Mall Association, 7 Butler Co L J 22 (1983).
107. In the situation where a citizen suit is brought under both section 601(a) and
section 601(c) the picture becomes even cloudier. One would think that if the statute of
limitations had run on the nuisance claim under section 601(a) that count should be dis-
missed. However, if the violation is ongoing, such as leachate from a landfill being dis-
charged into waters of the Commonwealth, a section 601(c) action should probably be per-
mitted to be maintained. The remedy of compelling compliance with the Clean Streams Law
in this case would amount to abating the nuisance (as previously discussed in this
comment).
108. The federal law in this area is markedly different than the state counterpart. The
difference is most dramatic in the ability of a citizen suit plaintiff to seek civil penalties.
While citizen suit plaintiffs are precluded from seeking civil penalties under the Pennsylva-
nia Clean Streams Law, the same citizen suit plaintiff can seek to have civil penalties as-
sessed against the defendant under the Federal Clean Water Act. In 1987, Congress
amended the Clean Water Act by adding section 309(g), 33 USC §1319(g), which creates
another obstacle in the maintenance of a citizen suit under the Federal Clean Water Act.
Without delving into this issue any further, suffice it to say that the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law does not contain an analogous provision. The discussion that follows pertains
only to the areas where the federal statute is similar to the Clean Streams Law.
109. 35 Pa Stat § 691.601(e).
110. 33 USC § 1365(b) provides in part: "No action may be commenced under [the
citizen suit provision] . . .if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation or order .. " Id.
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has an action "in a court."1 1 Notably, however, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals determined in SPIRG v Fritzsche, Dodge & 01-
cott, Inc.1 12 that some administrative actions might be the
equivalent of an action in court and thus might preclude a citizen
suit.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Fritzsche fol-
lowed its earlier decision in Baughman v Bradford Coal Co.,
Inc.,"' in which the court had determined that the Pennsylvania
Environmental Hearing Board was not a "court" and therefore a
citizen suit was not barred by the administrative proceeding.
1 4
Fritzsche held that some administrative actions could be the
equivalent of an action in a "court" under section 505 of the Clean
Water Act.11 ' The Third Circuit set forth a two-part inquiry to de-
termine whether the administrative action was equivalent to an ac-
tion "in a court." ' First, in order to be deemed to be an action in
a court, the administrative agency must possess coercive powers to
compel compliance that are equivalent to that of the EPA in a fed-
eral court. 11 7 Second, the agency proceeding must offer procedural
similarities to a suit in federal court (including the citizens right to
intervene). 1 Fritzsche determined that an EPA consent order was
not equivalent to an action in court because the EPA could not
impose any civil penalty, and because the EPA's enforcement ac-
tion did not resemble a court action in terms of procedural safe-
guards (i.e. no independent decision maker, no hearing, no wit-
nesses). Thus, while the Third Circuit determined that some
administrative actions might be the equivalent of action in a court,
it did not find an EPA consent order to be the equivalent of an
action in a court.119
Whether a court, in -construing the similar provision of the Clean
Streams Law, will follow the majority of cases and interpret the
statute in a literal manner, or whether the Third Circuit Court of
111. Sierra Club v Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 834 F2d 1517 (9th Cir 1987) and Friends of
the Earth v Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F2d 57 (2d Cir 1985) both held that nonjudicial
administrative enforcement, such as the issuance of an administrative order, is not an action
"in a court" and therefore does not bar a citizen suit.
112. 759 F2d 1131 (3d Cir 1985).
113. 592 F2d 215 (3d Cir 1979).
114. Id at 219.
115. Fritzsche, 759 F2d at 1137.
116. Id.
117. Id.




Appeal's interpretation of "action in a court" will be followed is
unknown at this time. It would appear, however, that under either
line of cases most administrative actions will not preclude citizen
suits.
The Clean Hands Doctrine
One final observation concerning the innovative use of the citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Streams Law by the plaintiffs in
Dresser Industries 12 and a possible bar to maintaining such a suit
must be made. Given that the plaintiff in that case was arguably
the cause of the discharges, it seems that the defendant could have
raised the clean hands doctrine. The clean hands doctrine basically
requires a party who seeks equitable action from a court to have
"clean hands."'121 The remedies available to a citizen suit plaintiff
under the Clean Streams Law are equitable remedies.122 Therefore,
the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" might be invoked by de-
fendants to preclude citizen suits in circumstances similar to
Dresser Industries."12
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, several of the potential bars to the maintenance of
citizen suits have been interpreted in the context of the federal
environmental statutes. Given the similarity of the language of the
pertinent provisions of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law to
these federal statutes, it is likely that the issues will be decided
under the Clean Streams Law just as these issues have been de-
cided by the federal courts interpretation of the analogous federal
statutes. However, one unique aspect of the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law is the dichotomy of section 601(a) and section 601(c).
The apparent redundancy of section 601(a) and section 601(c)
probably stems from the forty-three year period between the en-
actment of the Clean Streams Law in 1937 and the 1980 amend-
ments which added section 601(c). The Clean Streams Law, as
originally enacted, contained section 601(a) which arguably could
120. See note 28 and text following.
121. See, for example, Shapiro v Shapiro, 415 Pa 503, 204 A2d 266 (1964).
122. See note 56 and accompanying text.
123. The doctrine of clean hands was successfully invoked by a defendant of a CER-
CLA cost recovery action in Mardan Corp. v C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F Supp 1049 (D Ariz
1984). However, subsequent cases. interpreting CERCLA have generally disavowed the use
of an "unclean hands" defense. See, for example, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 669 F Supp 1285 (ED Pa 1987).
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be termed a citizen suit provision. Section 601(a), while giving pri-
vate citizens the ability to enforce the Clean Streams Law, is not
what most people today would call a true statutory citizen suit
provision as it merely refers a potential plaintiff to the common
law of public nuisance. Section 601(c), on the other hand, is what
most would consider a citizen suit provision in that it grants cer-
tain citizens the right to enforce the statute or to be "private At-
torney Generals." However, both section 601(a) and section 601(c)
enable private citizens to enforce the Clean Streams Law and,
therefore, both sections can and should be used by citizen suit
plaintiffs.
As discussed throughout this comment, there is much similarity
and overlap between section 601(a) and section 601(c). The subtle
distinctions, however, warrant careful analysis. As some of the
cases discussed in this comment demonstrate, a citizen suit plain-
tiff must be aware of the differences between the two subsections
of section 601 of the Clean Streams Law. By bringing a citizen suit
under the proper subsection of section 601, the plaintiff can avoid
having his suit dismissed for a variety of reasons (e.g. lack of
standing, lack of subject matter jurisdiction). It appears that the
most cautious procedure would be to include counts based on both
section 601(a) and on section 601(c) in a Clean Streams Law citi-
zen suit. Nonetheless, the citizen suit plaintiff should be aware of
the differences between the two subsections in order to effectively
respond to any and all challenges to the maintenance of the citizen
suit brought under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law.
Michael H. Winek
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